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Value-Based Insurance Design:More
Health at Any Price
A.Mark Fendrick, Jenifer J. Martin, and Alison E. Weiss
When everyone is required to pay the same out-of-pocket amount for health care
services regardless of clinical indication, there is evidence of underuse of high-value
services and overuse of interventions of no or marginal clinical beneﬁt. Unlike most
current health plan designs, value-based insurance design (V-BID) acknowledges het-
erogeneity of clinical interventions and patient characteristics. It encourages the use of
services with strong evidence of clinical beneﬁt and likewise discourages the use of
low-value services. Implementing this concept into the national policy debate required
a strategy that included conceptual framework development, program implementa-
tion, rigorous evaluation, media outreach, and an advocacy plan. Upon completion of
this strategy involving several colleagues from multiple disciplines, Congress included
language speciﬁcally authorizing V-BID in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act. A wide-ranging approach, planned as early as possible, can lead to the successful
translation of health services research to policy.
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RESTORING HEALTH TOTHE HEALTH CARE REFORM
DEBATE
Cost sharing plays a critical role in deﬁning the health care beneﬁt. To balance
the demands for access to medical interventions with pressures to constrain
costs, levels of cost sharing must be set in a manner that achieves appropriate
clinical and ﬁnancial outcomes. In most public and private plans, however,
the level of patient cost sharing is the same for every doctor visit, diagnostic
test, or prescription drug within a speciﬁc pharmacy tier, regardless of clinical
indication. While health care services are heterogeneous in the clinical beneﬁt
produced, setting the same coinsurance rate for all cancer screenings indepen-
dent of the evidence base, and charging the same copayment for prescription
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drugs for the treatment of diabetes and onychomycosis seemed inefﬁcient and
can lead to underutilization of essential medical services. To mitigate the nega-
tive health impact of this archaic “one size ﬁts all” beneﬁt design, we proposed
an alternative “clinically sensitive” approach that adjusts patients’ out-of-
pocket costs based on an assessment of clinical beneﬁt. This concept came to
be known as value-based insurance design (or V-BID, originally referred to as
the “Beneﬁt-Based Copay”) (Fendrick et al. 2001; Fendrick and Chernew
2006; Chernew, Rosen, and Fendrick 2007).
Given the abundant evidence that U.S. adults receive only about one
half of recommended care (McGlynn et al. 2003) and use services of marginal
or no beneﬁt (Hoffman and Pearson 2009), applying clinical nuance to set
patients’ out-of-pocket costs made sense from clinical and ﬁnancial perspec-
tives. On this basis, a research hypothesis emerged that the alignment of
patients’ ﬁnancial incentives with evidence-based care would encourage the
use of high-value services and ultimately produce more health at any level of
health expenditure. Soon after, a parallel agenda to translate research into pol-
icy was developed. Achieving this policy objective required a strategy that
included the following: conceptual framework development; program imple-
mentation; rigorous evaluation; media outreach; and an advocacy plan that
would move the idea from academia to the attention of key health policy
stakeholders, including consumer advocates, health plans, professional socie-
ties, employers, labor leaders, and policy makers.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION DEVELOPMENT
In 2001, the conceptual framework for V-BID—with mathematical derivation
and clinical applications—was published in the American Journal of Managed
Care (Fendrick et al. 2001). That paper made clear that blunt cost-sharing
mechanisms implemented to constrain costs raised concerns regarding missed
opportunities to enhance clinical outcomes and the possibility of higher long-
term medical expenditures. Acknowledging the critical role of cost in deﬁning
the health care beneﬁt, it was argued that cost-sharing levels must be set in a
manner that achieves appropriate clinical and ﬁnancial outcomes. Since cost
Address correspondence to A. Mark Fendrick, M.D., Departments of Internal Medicine and
Health Management & Policy, Center for Value-Based Insurance Design, University of Michigan,
300 North Ingalls Building Room 7E06, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-0429; e-mail: amfen@umich.edu.
Jenifer J. Martin, J.D. and Alison E. Weiss, M.P.P., are with the Center for Value-Based Insurance
Design, University ofMichigan, AnnArbor,MI.
Value-Based Insurance Design 405
containment efforts should not produce preventable reductions in quality of
care, a novel design was introduced, in which patient contributions are based
on the potential for clinical beneﬁt, taking into consideration the patient’s clin-
ical condition. Implementation of such a system would provide a ﬁnancial
incentive for individuals to make treatment decisions based on the value of
their services, not exclusively their price, and potentially mitigate the
decreased use of essential services due to high levels of patient cost sharing.
RESEARCH SUPPORTING INCREASES IN COST
SHARING REDUCES USE OF HIGH-VALUE SERVICES
Services with strong evidence of clinical beneﬁt—usually primary prevention
interventions and services that treat chronic diseases—are relatively easy to
identify, because many are integrated into quality improvement programs
such as pay for performance, disease management, and health plan accredita-
tion. While underuse of these services was well established (McGlynn et al.
2003), it was necessary to demonstrate that patients use these services less
when it costs them more. Review of the published evidence concluded that
charging patients more reduced the utilization of high-value services (e.g., can-
cer screenings (Trivedi, Rakowski, and Ayanian 2008), drugs for chronic dis-
eases (Huskamp et al. 2003; Gibson, Ozminkowski, and Goetzel 2005; Hsu,
Price, and Huang 2006; Goldman, Joyce, and Zheng 2007; Zeber, Grazier,
and Valenstein 2007), physician visits (Trivedi, Moloo, and Mor 2010),
reduced quality metrics as measured by HEDIS (Chernew and Gibson 2008),
and worsened health care disparities (Chernew et al. 2008a).
ADOPTION OFV-BID
The acceptance that higher levels of cost sharing hindered use of high-value
services enabled the implementation of V-BID demonstration projects that
allowed the opportunity to prove the hypothesis that removing ﬁnancial barri-
ers would enhance their use. As the peer-reviewed evidence accumulated and
drew attention from the popular press (Hensley 2004; Freudenheim 2007; Fu-
hrmans 2007), public and private entities, including employers, health plans,
and pharmacy beneﬁt managers, began to implement V-BID programs. The
positive press reporting about early adopters was spontaneous, but media
outreach later evolved into an important component of implementation and
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legislative outreach. Reports focusing on V-BID’s approach to aligning incen-
tives helped translate academic language into policy-ready material. Pitney
Bowes is the most celebrated V-BID early adopter; its program providing co-
pay relief for drugs to treat asthma and diabetes demonstrated that V-BID is
feasible, acceptable to employees, and produces clinical and economic returns
(Mahoney 2008). Other VBID pioneers, including Aetna Insurance; the City
of Asheville, North Carolina; Marriott International; the State of Maine; Well-
Point Inc; United HealthCare; and the University of Michigan have been well
chronicled (Fuhrmans 2007). V-BID is used by a diverse and growing number
of entities; two 2008 surveys reported that 12–30 percent of employers use
some form of V-BID strategy (Choudhry, Rosenthal, andMilstein 2010).
RESEARCH SUPPORTING DECREASES IN COST
SHARING INCREASES USE OF HIGH-VALUE SERVICES
Measuring the effects of V-BID programs is inexact, but efforts have shed light
on the impact of different cost-sharing arrangements on health care utilization.
Most early data, although compelling, were self-reported and anecdotal,
derived from the popular press, or based on pre–post experiences without
control groups. More rigorous computer simulations conclude that copay
reductions for diabetes and hyperlipidemia treatments would save lives and
money when compared to the status quo (Rosen et al. 2005; Goldman, Joyce,
and Karaca-Mandic 2006).
There is a dearth of data from well-designed prospective evaluations of
V-BID programs. In a study of one large employer’s V-BID initiative, Cher-
new et al. (2008b) used an appropriate control group to assess the effects of
reducing copayments for ﬁve chronic medication classes in the context of
a disease management program. This study found increased adherence in four
of the ﬁve classes and a decrease in nonadherence by 7–14 percent. An accom-
panying ﬁnancial analysis concluded that from the societal perspective, the
V-BID program led to reduced use of nondrug health care services offsetting
the costs associated with additional drugs used due to lower cost sharing
(Chernew et al. 2010).
Choudhry and colleagues reported that Pitney Bowes’ program that
eliminated copayments for statins increased adherence by 2.8 percent. Adher-
ence rose by 4 percent when copayments were reduced for clopidogrel (Cho-
udhry et al. 2010). A study by Maciejewski and colleagues examining Blue
Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina’s broad efforts to eliminate or reduce
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copayments for medications produced similar results; adherence for enrollees
with diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and congestive heart failure
increased between 1.5 and 3.8 percent when patients paid less than employees
who were not offered the V-BID option (Maciejewski et al. 2010). A study by
Gibson et al. assessed the impact of a V-BID program for two groups of dia-
betic patients, those who participated in a disease management program and
those who opted out of it. The 3-year evaluation reported a similar modest
effect on medication adherence and that the V-BID program reduced diabe-
tes-speciﬁc spending and did not increase aggregate health care expenditures
(Gibson,Mahoney, and Ranghell 2011).
From the available evidence, it appears—but is not deﬁnitively proven
—that patients respond to both increases and decreases in out-of-pocket costs
when it comes to the use of essential medical services. Yet it is abundantly clear
that cost is one of many factors that contribute to nonadherence to potentially
life-saving interventions. Debate continues, however, over the extent to which
these increases in utilization will impact clinical outcomes and whether the
estimated savings/return on investment (ROI) will be realized.
FROM RESEARCH TO INCLUSION OFV-BID IN
NATIONALHEALTH REFORM
Formal advocacy efforts began in late 2006. The initial goal was to present the
potential merits of V-BID and educate stakeholders about how this concept
could relate to ongoing health care policy deliberations. Our team met with
staff for Members of Congress, including then-Senator Hillary Clinton, House
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell, Senator Edward
Kennedy, and then-Senator Barack Obama, who drafted the ﬁrst bill on
V-BID, which was never formally introduced due to other political priorities.
Presentation materials included peer-reviewed publications, media reports,
and case studies of implementation, but the most effective piece was a one-
page summary that concisely described our clinical and policy goals.
After the 2008 presidential election, health care emerged as a legislative
priority. Both parties began an intensive search for promising ideas for con-
taining health care costs and improving quality of care. As a result of a series
of meetings with Senate staff, the V-BID concept gathered momentum as one
of the few initiatives that simultaneously addressed quality improvement and
cost containment. On advice of Congressional staff, an effort to build a coali-
tion of stakeholders, including labor unions, patient advocacy groups, and
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payers, was undertaken, as their support was deemed essential before receiv-
ing acceptance from policy makers. This coalition-building effort led to addi-
tional meetings with organizations such as the Department of Veterans Affairs
(which led a draft Senate bill for a V-BID pilot in the VAMC that was never
introduced) and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (whose health staff provided
key insights on how any V-BID legislation might be “scored”). Once a broad
coalition was assembled and no hurdles were identiﬁed by key government
health care agencies, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) and Senator Deb-
bie Stabenow (D-MI) introduced S. 1040, the Seniors’Medication Copayment
Reduction Act, in May 2009. The bill directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to establish a demonstration program to test V-BID method-
ologies for Medicare beneﬁciaries with certain chronic conditions. The bill
deﬁned V-BID as “a methodology for identifying speciﬁc medications or clas-
ses of medications for which, because of their high value and effectiveness
when prescribed for particular clinical conditions, copayments or coinsurance
should be reduced or eliminated.” Although the bill remained in committee,
this would prove to be an important step for V-BID in the national health care
reform debate.
Later in 2009, the publication of two white papers enhanced the posi-
tioning of V-BID on Capitol Hill. The ﬁrst was the 2009 Medicare Payment
Advisory Committee Report to Congress (Dr. Chernew was a MedPAC com-
missioner) that included a recommendation to set cost sharing based on clini-
cal beneﬁt (http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun10_EntireReport.pdf;
accessed August 11, 2010); and a Brookings Institution bipartisan report enti-
tled “Bending the Curve” (Dr. Chernew was a co-author), which noted the util-
ity of V-BID as a cost control mechanism (Brookings Institution, Engelberg
Center for Health Care Reform 2010).
While the goal of the Hill meetings remained purely educational,
V-BID principles were included in every draft of national health reform legis-
lation. H.R. 3200, the July, 2009 version of the House bill that was considered
by the House Committees on Energy and Commerce, Education and Labor,
and Ways and Means, stated, “To the extent allowed by the beneﬁt standards
applied to all Exchange-participating health beneﬁt plans, the public insur-
ance option may modify cost-sharing and payment rates to encourage the use
of services that promote health and value.” This language was retained when
the three different versions passed out of these committees were combined
into H.R. 3962, the so-called tri-committee bill, in October of 2009.
On the Senate side, the Finance Committee approved a version of
the legislation in October, S. 1796. The Committee noted in its report,
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“Avalue-based design is deﬁned as a methodology that would reduce or elimi-
nate cost-sharing for the clinically beneﬁcial screenings, lifestyle interventions,
medications, immunizations, diagnostic tests and other procedures and treat-
ments to reﬂect their high value and effectiveness.” (Staffers later informed
that inclusion of V-BID helped break a deadlock in the negotiations over co-
payments in the health exchanges between the Committee’s Chairman, Sena-
tor Max Baucus, and the Ranking Member, Senator Charles Grassley.) In late
December, Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced a version of health reform
as an amendment to H.R. 3590. This bill, the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (PPACA), passed and was signed into law in March 2010, con-
tained the ﬁnal version of the VBID language in Section 2713(c): “The
Secretary may develop guidelines to permit a group health plan and a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage to uti-
lize value-based insurance designs.”
TRANSLATION OF RESEARCH TO POLICY
In July 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services, along with the
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor, issued an interim
ﬁnal rule (IFR) implementing the portion of PPACA that eliminates copay-
ments for certain preventive services. With these regulations, the Departments
created the ﬁrst deﬁnition of V-BID in federal law, “Value-based insurance
designs include the provision of information and incentives for consumers that
promote access to and use of higher value providers, treatments, and ser-
vices.” The IFR also stated, “The Departments recognize the important role
that value-based insurance design can play in promoting the use of appropri-
ate preventive services.” These regulations went into effect for private plans in
September 2010 and provide an opportunity to conduct rigorous evaluations
of the clinical and economic implications of waiving cost sharing for high
value preventive services. In March 2011, V-BID was explicitly mentioned in
the HHS National Quality Strategy, in which consumer incentives and beneﬁt
design were one of the policies and Infrastructure needed to support priorities
(http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/quality03212011a.html;
accessed September 28, 2011).
The ultimate test of health reform will be whether it expands coverage in
a way that improves health and addresses rising costs. V-BID addresses both
of these critical health reform goals, and it has clear synergies with major
health care reform initiatives, such as comparative effectiveness research,
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payment reform, and information technology (Chernew and Fendrick 2007;
Fendrick and Chernew 2007; Fendrick, Smith, and Chernew 2010). These
attributes, coupled with a well-conceived, multistakeholder advocacy strategy,
led to the successful translation of health services research to policy.
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